"Familiarity Does Not Breed Contempt: Generosity, Discrimination and Diversity in Delhi Schools"
May 2018

APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL TABLES

Table A1. Comparing Control, Treatment and Delayed Treatment Schools

School type:	(1) Control Schools	(2) Treatment Schools	(3) Delayed Treatment
Annual Tuition ('000 Rupees)	101 (16)	113 (22)	120 (21)
Cohort Size*	252	278	252
Students per classroom	36	37	35
Age of School (years)	40	39	52
Avg of Median Household Income ('000 Rupees)	1,240	1,340	1,400
Mother's education (years)	14.3	14.7	15.1
Schools in Sample	4	11	2
Students in Sample	595	1284	485

* In untreated grades 4 and 5, which began schooling before the policy change.

Table A2. Egalitarian Preferences – Full sample versus younger siblings sample

Dependent Variable: Indicator for Choosing the more egalitarian option in dictator game

	Equality Game (5,5) v (6,1)		Disinterested Game 1 (0,4,4) v (0,8,3)		Disinterested Game 2 (0,4,4) v (0,12,0)	
	DiD Full Sample (1)	DiD Younger Sibs (2)	DiD Full Sample (3)	DiD Younger Sibs (4)	DiD Full Sample (5)	DiD Younger Sibs (6)
Treated Classroom	0.0863	0.102	0.122	0.106	0.123	0.0697
	(0.0486)	(0.0518)	(0.0616)	(0.0670)	(0.0293)	(0.0358)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	School, Grade	School, Grade	School, Grade	School, Grade	School, Grade	School, Grade
p-value (CGM)	0.132	0.0940	0.19	0.286	0	0.0820
p-value (Permute School x Grade)	0.001	0.00300	0	0.00300	0	0.00900
p-value (Permute Schools)	0.0985	0.129	0.022	0.0510	0.0015	0.149
Control Mean	0.538	0.552	0.473	0.486	0.774	0.779
Control SD	0.499	0.498	0.499	0.500	0.418	0.415
N	2364	1348	2364	1348	2364	1348

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports results of linear probability models of the likelihood of choosing the more equal or egalitarian of two options in three binary choice dictator games. **Odd** numbered columns report results for the full sample, as in the main tables, while **even** numbered columns report estimates for students who have older siblings already enrolled in their school. **Cols 1 and 2** report shares choosing (5,5) over (6,1). **Cols 3 and 4** report shares choosing (0,4,4) over (0,8,3). **Cols 5 and 6** report shares choosing (0,4,4) over (0,12,0). All columns report difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of having poor students in one's classroom, incorporating school fixed effects and grade fixed effects. In these columns, standard errors are clustered at the school-by-grade level. The first p-value reported in the table is instead calculated with clustering at the school level (k=17) using the wild-cluster bootstrap-t of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). The second p-value reported in the table comes from a randomization inference procedure which permutes treatment at the school-by-grade level. The third p-value comes from a randomization inference procedure which instead permutes the schools labeled as control, treatment, and delayed treatment schools, and accordingly permutes treatment. Individual **controls** used throughout include gender, age, whether the student's family owns a car, and whether the student uses a private (chauffeured) car to commute to school.

Table A3. Willingess to Accept a Play Date with Rich Children
(Experiment in k=3 schools)

Dependent Variable:
Willingness to Accept to Attend Play Date (Rupees)

	(1)	(3)
Specification:	DiD	IV
Sample:	Full Sample	Treated Class
Treated Classroom	3.177	
	(2.650)	
Has Poor Study Partner		-1.945
		(6.124)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	School, Grade	Classroom
p-value	0.23	0.75
Control Mean	14.22	12.68
Control SD	16..47	15.97
N	437	152

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports regression results for wealthy students' minimum willingness to accept to attend a play date with other wealthy children. **Col 1** reports a difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of having poor students in one's classroom, with unclustered standard errors. **Col 2** reports IV estimates of the effect of having a poor study partner, and presents robust standard errors. Individual **controls** include gender, age, mother's education, distance of student's home from school, and whether the student uses a private (chauffeured) car to commute to school.

Table A4. Test Scores in English, Hindi and Math – Full sample versus younger siblings sample

	Dependent Variable: Normalized Test Score							
	Combined		**English**		**Hindi**		**Math**	
Specification:	DiD	DiD	DiD	DiD	DiD	DiD	DiD	DiD
Sample:	Full	Sibs	Full	Sibs	Full	Sibs	Full	Sibs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treated Classroom	-0.0388	-0.109	-0.169	-0.171	0.0428	-0.0635	0.0099	-0.0941
	(0.0434)	(0.0536)	(0.0886)	(0.119)	(0.0769)	(0.0865)	(0.0849)	(0.122)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	School, Grade	School, Grade	School, Grade	School, Grade	School, Grade	School, Grade	School, Grade	School, Grade
p-value (CGM)	0.41	0.0440	0.092	0.244	0.686	0.458	0.936	0.458
p-value (Permute School x Grade)	0.246	0.0195	0.001	0.00850	0.333	0.328	0.893	0.290
p-value (Permute Schools)	0.547	0.166	0.103	0.0930	0.60	0.542	0.918	0.531
Control Mean	0	0.0134	0	0.0274	0	-0.0186	0	0.0313
Control SD	0.595	0.589	1.000	1.002	1.000	1.006	1.000	1.006
N	2364	1348	2364	1348	2364	1348	2364	1348

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports effects on normalized test scores of wealthy students in English, Hindi and Math. **Odd** numbered columns report results for the full sample, as in the main tables, while **even** numbered columns report estimates for students who have older siblings already enrolled in their school. All columns report difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of having poor students in one's classroom, incorporating school fixed effects and grade fixed effects. In these columns, standard errors are clustered at the school-by-grade level. The first p-value reported in the table is instead calculated with clustering at the school level (k=17) using the wild-cluster bootstrap-t of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). The second p-value reported in the table comes from a randomization inference procedure which permutes treatment at the school-by-grade level. The third p-value comes from a randomization inference procedure which instead permutes the schools labeled as control, treatment, and delayed treatment schools, and accordingly permutes treatment. Individual **controls** used throughout include gender, age, whether the student's family owns a car, and whether the student uses a private (chauffeured) car to commute to school.

Appendix B. Experimental Procedures for Dictator Games

B.1. Detailed description of protocol.

Within each school, students were assigned to specific experimental sessions. We conducted a total of 268 sessions across 17 schools. The sessions were held in a separate room in the school (rather than in each student's regular classroom). Each session was conducted in small groups of six to ten students at a time, with students mixed across grades. Before beginning the experimental session, each student provided verbal and written consent to participate.

Students played two sets of games, with a short break between sets. The order of the games was randomized within each set, with randomization by computer at the session level.

At the start of the first set, students were each provided one envelope (marked with a unique serial number) containing a decision sheet and a photograph of the recipient's school. This was either a school catering to disadvantaged students, or an elite private (control) school, depending on the randomized order for the session. The students were asked by the experimenter (i.e. the research assistant) to open the envelope and carefully look at the photographs of the school. The experimenter read out the name of the recipient's school, and explained the use of the decision sheet.

The decision sheet itself contained a table with rows corresponding to the possible splits of the endowment. The student's payoff was in the left column, and the recipient's payoff was in the right column. The allocations summed to 10 rupees, with only integer values permitted. Students were asked to circle their desired allocation. As a check, they also filled in blanks stating how much they would receive, and how much the recipient would receive.

After the game was verbally described to the students, the experimenter answered any questions they had. The game proceeded only once the students appeared to understand the procedure well, and were able to correctly state how much they would receive by circling each row. Students then marked their choice on their decision sheet, placed the decision sheet and descriptive materials back in the envelope, sealed it and returned it to the experimenter.

Next, the experimenter explained that they would play a second game, with a different recipient than in the previous game, and that one of the two games would be randomly chosen to be implemented by flipping a coin. The envelope for the second game was then handed out, and the same procedure was followed as described above. After the second game was completed, a coin was flipped to decide which game would be implemented from the first set.

After a short break, the second set of experiments began. Again, one envelope was handed out at a time, each containing a single decision sheet. The order of the games was randomized at the session level. As in the previous set, the experimenter provided a verbal description of the payoffs, and answered any questions before the students made their decisions and sealed their decision sheet in the envelope. After the three games in the second set were completed, one game was selected by a draw of lots to be implemented.

Finally, a short debriefing survey was handed out. While the debriefing surveys were being completed, participant payoffs were prepared by a second research assistant in another room. After the debriefing surveys were collected, each student was provided with a sealed envelope containing their combined payoff from the two implemented games. Participants could then, if they so desired, exchange any part of their payoff (together with any other money they had on their person) for candy from a store set up by the experimenter.

B.2. Experimental Script.

Hello, everyone! My name is XXX. I am a scientist, and we are doing a study in your school. Today, you will have the chance to play some games. Your teachers and parents have given permission for you to play these games. But, you do not have to play the games if you don't want to. You can stop at any time and go back to your classroom.

Game 1

The game works like this. You will get Rs. 10 if you play the game. Then, you will be matched with a student in a different school. We won't tell you their name, and we will never tell them your name either. But, you have the chance to share that Rs. 10 with them. You do not have to share any money if you don't want to – you can keep it all. If you want to share some money, you can share Rs. 1, Rs. 2, Rs. 3…any amount up to Rs. 10. The more you share with them, the less you will keep for yourself.

There is no "right" thing to do in this game. Just do whatever you would like to do. We will not tell any of your classmates, your teachers or your parents what you decided to do.

In the end, you can use the money you have to buy toffees from the shop outside, if you want to.

Now, let me tell you a little bit more about the student you are playing with. Please open the envelope on your desk. You will see a photograph of their school. The school's name is XXX. Each of you will be matched with a different student from that school. That student will receive anything that you decide to share. Please look at the photograph carefully and think about the student you might be matched with, who goes to that school.

Now look at the sheet with the numbers on it. On that sheet, you will secretly write your decision – how much of the Rs. 10 you want to keep for yourself, and how much you want to share with the student in the other school. But don't write anything yet. Let me explain how to play.

You have to decide which row to circle. Each row is a different option. The number of the left is the amount you will get, and the number on the right is what the student in the other school will get. So, if you circle the first row, you will keep all 10 rupees, and the other student will get zero. If you circle the second row, you will keep 9 rupees, and the other student will get 1 rupee. Do you understand? Do you have any questions?

[*Experimenter goes to each student and goes over the decision sheet, pointing out the options*]

Okay, are there any other questions before you play the game?

Now, if you have decided how much you want to keep, and how much you want to share, circle the row that you decided. Then fill in the blanks with what you will keep for yourself on the left, and what the student in the other school will get from you on the right. The numbers to fill in the blanks should be the same numbers from the row you decided to circle.

If you circled the wrong row by mistake, just tell me, and I will give you a fresh sheet.

Okay, has everyone finished circling the row and filling in the blanks? Good! Now, just put the sheet and the photograph back in the envelope and close it. Great, you finished the first game!

Game 2

Now we are going to play a second game. It will be like the first game, but this time you are playing with a different student. Like the first game, you will again get Rs. 10, and you will decide how much to share with the other student. You can share any amount, it does not have to be the same as last time.

Now, open your envelope and look carefully at the photograph. It shows the school that the student you are playing with in this game goes to. You will notice that it is a different school from the previous one. The name of this school is XXX. Again, each of you will be matched with a different student from this school. That student will receive any amount that you decide to share. We will not tell you the name of the student you are playing with, and we will not tell them your name either. Please look at the photograph carefully and think about the student you might be matched with, who goes to that school.

Just like in the last game, you need to circle one row on the sheet and fill in the blanks when you decide what to share. Remember, we won't tell anyone what you decided to share with them. There is no right answer – you should choose whatever you want.

After you decide, we will toss a coin. If it comes up heads, the decision you made in the first game will actually happen. If it comes up tails, the decision you make in this game will happen. So you will only get money from one of the two games, depending on the coin toss. And only the student you played with in that game will receive any money. Okay?

Do you have any questions?

Now, please circle the row you decided on, and fill out the blanks. Remember, on the left is the amount you will get, and on the right is the amount that the student in the other school will get.

If you circled the wrong row by mistake, just tell me, and I will give you a fresh sheet.

Okay, has everyone finished circling the row and filling in the blanks? Good! Now, just put the sheet and the photograph back in the envelope and close it. Well done, you finished the second game!